GIVEN THE FREEDOM TO ASK ANYTHING, WHAT QUESTIONS OUGHT THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLAR EXPLORE? USING GARDAM'S 'ALIEN' TO EXAMINE THIS QUESTION rEbECCa LaforGia introduCtion
Although Judith Gardam's work dealt with some of the most serious and poignant areas of international law, that of international humanitarian law and aspects of proportionality and gender, her writing was also creative and exploratory. An example of this creativity was her chapter in Sexing the Subject of Law, in which she used the device of an alien to investigate what international humanitarian law looks like from the outside. Gardam's chapter was entitled 'An Alien's Encounter with the Law of Armed Conflict'. Her device of using a fantasy character of an alien to investigate what law looks like is adopted in this chapter. I have chosen this as the organising idea of my chapter in honour of Gardam for two reasons: first, in conversation, Gardam said that she enjoyed writing her chapter; and second, she created an intriguing idea that I strongly believe merits exploration and, indeed, reapplying in the twenty-first century. The idea that Gardam created is to understand the players in international law -the subjects of international law -by examining the 'distinguishing features of these players' and thereby elucidating their 'distinguishing features'. 1 So, if you like, I am attempting to place myself in the role of an alien with nothing to do during an intergalactic storm but to browse through the law of armed conflict. This alien of mine desires to know something of the beings or the subject(s) described by these documents. What do they look like? What do they value? Are they all the same or are there various types? And, if so, what are their distinguishing features? 2 My chapter will use this device of the 'alien' as a form of personified objectivity, 3 but rather than examining international humanitarian law, I will take Gardam's alien and consider the question: What is the role of the scholar of international law? The alien will travel through space, first viewing the world from afar, 4 and then coming into law's orbit, landing and speaking to an individual. At each point, the alien will reflect on the various levels of analysis which scholars could employ in their scholarship. So, for example, the scholar could ask questions that consider the relationship of international law with the whole world, or its relationship with the state or particular individuals. The purpose of this chapter is to consider through the alien's eyes whether there is any obligation for the international legal scholar to approach international law from a particular perspective. It narrows down the question of the international legal scholar's identity through the medium of space and geography, and asks: Is there any particular level of analysis in which international scholars should be engaging -and if so, why? This is a relevant question, but it is not an original one. The question has been considered by others. For example, Koskenniemi explored the identity of the international legal academic as hovering between the identities of 'the advisor' and 'the activist'. 5 This chapter contributes to the identity of the international scholar, which comes from facing the question that anything can be written about when we contemplate the 'vista'. Given that freedom, from which level of analysis should international scholars investigate the law? This is an acute paradox for the international legal academic: if everything is possible, is there any way of choosing a particular level of analysis which is an ideal position for the international legal academic? Others, such as Charlesworth, have argued that particular roles for academic inquiry should include the 'international law of everyday life'. 6 However, this chapter is somewhat more agnostic; it is written in a tone of detached curiosity in which judgment is suspended. The methodology of this chapter follows that of Gardam's original construction of 'the alien'. The alien travels and observes, and the reflections emerge through the rhetorical device of a conversation between me and the alien at the end of the article. Then the observations are 'revealed'. Therefore, this chapter uses not only the imagery but also the method developed by Gardam in her original work.
The argument and the action of this chapter unfold in four sections. The first section orientates and expands on the device of 'the alien', briefly considering writers who have also dealt with organising ideas of space and geography in international law. The question of the level of analysis, regarding the perspective from which international scholars should or might conceive of their discipline, has been surveyed by international scholars.
7 These surveys will be reviewed. Therefore, the purpose of the first section is to give normalcy to the idea of the alien travelling. It is a useful and vivid idea; however, the concepts of space, geography and level of analysis on which the journey depends have been dealt with by others, and their work will be introduced. The next section is entitled 'The Travels' and is divided into four thematic explorations. I begin by explaining how the alien sees the world from afar. Indeed, the broadest question the international legal academic can ask and investigate in terms of international law is: what is international law as a whole? 9 At the second thematic level, the alien travels, still seeing the world from a distance and not landing in any particular place, but nevertheless detecting pattern with some clarity -for example, patterns of deforestation, or of access to wealth and housing, or of development. This detection of patterns is the next point at which the international scholar can operate:
10 exploring historically inherited patterns of inequality and distribution, questioning how and why it occurs. At the third level, the alien lands -perhaps, for the purposes of this chapter, within Adelaide, Australia. This is the nation state. Finally, at the fourth thematic level, the alien comes up to speak to the individual, me, within the office: this is the most particular of the international legal analyses, the 'micro-legal analysis'. 11 The last section of this chapter, entitled 'Reversals', arises from this conversation, making observations on the international academic's role. 
sPaCE, timE and LEVEL of anaLysis
The use of geography in international law is not new; 13 nor, indeed, is the level of analysis 14 employed in this chapter. 15 The use of geography and 'space' (very loosely, a geographical term) in this chapter is more in line with that of Osofsky, who contends that geography and space need to be conceptualised in both global and pluralistic ways. Osofsky quotes the humanist geographer Yi-Fu Tuan in order to bring geography to bear on the notion of exploring in greater detail this concept of 'place' and 'space': 'In experience, the meaning of space often merges with that of place … Furthermore, if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place'. 16 The idea of pausing transforms space into place. The alien is 'pausing' at each geographical location, and in doing so, the stopping then becomes a place.
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The level of analysis that was briefly alluded to in the above introduction is also not a new concept. It has been considered from different perspectives by a variety of authors. The most famous article, by Singer, speaks about the level of analysis generally. 18 According to Singer, '[i]n any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always While international law may make reference to physical characteristics of the world, its geography is that of a world of ideas which is imposed upon the physical world'.
14 Osofsky, above n 5, 440: 'the New Haven School has a thoughtful analysis of the import of scale, but does not fundamentally define or interrogate what scale is. In particular, its vision of world community engages scale in two senses. First, the "world" is a relevant level worthy of focus. In order to understand international lawmaking, we have to grapple with interactions happening at a planetary level. Second, the "world" scale is inherently multiscalar'.
15 On the 'level of analysis', see generally Singer, above n 7, 77-92. 18 Singer, above n 7.
several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged for the purpose of systematic analysis'. 19 He continues:
Whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system. He may, for example, choose between the flowers or the gardens, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, the houses or the neighbourhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang, the legislature or the legislative, and so on. Whether he selects the micro-or macro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological or conceptual convenience. Yet the choice often turns out to be quite difficult, and may well become a central issue within the discipline concerned. The complexity and significance of these level-of-analysis decisions are readily suggested by the long-standing controversy between social psychology and sociology, personality-oriented and culture-oriented anthropology, or micro-and macro-economics, to mention but a few.
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Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of the above decisions are presented neutrally by Singer, who states that we should own these advantages and disadvantages, depending upon the level of analysis that we choose. Singer's work can be contrasted with writings that are invested in the level of analysis as a theoretical battleground -for example, discussions on the universal and the particular within the context of legal reasoning. 21 In these works, there is strong disagreement as to the role of the particular or universal.
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That is not the approach taken in this chapter. Rather, in this section, the advantages and disadvantages of each level of analysis are described as neutrally as possible. The purpose of this chapter is not to resolve a philosophical disagreement, but to link how we write with our identity as international legal academics. If each of the levels of analysis is equally on offer, if each of them is equally defensible philosophically, if we are agnostic to that point, is there anything about our purposes as academics which would sway us to choose one level rather than another? Sociological approaches to international law have also employed the level-of-analysis method. The Unity of Law and Morality I argued that law reduced to morality. I now think that whilst the unity is right, the truth is that morality reduces to law. All questions that now pass for moral questions really are legal questions. The reason for this is that Hegel was quite wrong: law is particular, not universal'.
level-of-analysis approach in his sociological work. 23 Here, Hirsch offers a similarly detached view to that of Singer, reviewing the advantages of each. This chapter approaches the question in a similar manner, distancing itself from a theoretical claim of resolving the level of analysis, 24 examining the practical function of the international legal academic who writes on international law and offers reflections on what is the best level to undertake and why.
The last introductory concept discussed in this section is the idea of considering the identity of the legal academic. This idea was considered by Koskenniemi. 25 In The Politics of International Law, Koskenniemi outlined a number of roles in which international law operates, and evaluated the identities of the players within those roles, including the role of the 'academic'. 26 Here, Koskenniemi examined Bourdieu's use of the concept of the 'juridical' field and explored the various identities that arose within and from this field. Underscoring the contested quality of the role of the academic, Koskenniemi noted:
The academic's position is much less stable than that of the activist or the advisor, hovering as it does between the two: a commitment to a relational and, if possible, scientifically argued vision of rule of law; and a wish to be associated with those positions of influence that are available to government advisors.
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Koskenniemi's exploration of the academic's role in this chapter referred to the academic as lacking responsibility in terms of actual political judgment, and suggested that if they decided to engage with advising the government, they would be 'howl[ing] with the wolfs'. 28 This places the international academic in a very precarious setting. Indeed, the work is a criticism of the international legal scholar as 'However, it is to be hoped that the scholar or for that matter practitioner, freed of illusion, eyes wide open, will not simply relapse into the armchair, but will find ways to employ her legal competence and skills modestly in the service of collective resistance and struggle. If not, she will fall into a striking performative contradiction'. Bowring's observations are cogent, but I do not consider the idea of the 'armchair' as offensive; my objective is to reflect rather than to critique. Therefore, the approach of this article does not even subscribe to an ethos of pluralism; it is more detached than that. 'being without responsibility to anyone about his or her statements'. 29 Koskenniemi continues:
For both the activist and the advisor, the academic may seem like the true cynic, falling short of a commitment to ideals or to power, enjoying both the privilege of academic freedom, which elevates the academic to the status of the truth-speaker, and occasional counselling work that satisfies the academic's quest for practical relevance.
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Koskenniemi is making generalities about how we can move to critique, advise and use indeterminacy to proffer our interpretations. But in the end, we know, always and completely, that we can withdraw back to academic isolation. The purpose of this chapter is to embrace that academic isolation. We are not actors, or soldiers, or aid workers; we do not run orphanages, or clear land mines, or create foreign policy. We have been given a type of secular freedom -a role in education that, while not perfect, does not answer to generals, to business, or to human needs for food and care. Given this freedom and isolation, is there something that we should be writing about as international academics? The purpose of this chapter is in part to face a paradox of the international legal academic -namely, that if everything is possible, is there any way of absolving or living up to a more responsible identity as an international academic?
thE traVELs
The Alien Sees the World from Afar
The travels are put in one section because this is not an attempt to critique or to reconcile the level of analysis. It is an overview of the alien and what she sees. This section contains a broad overview of what the level of analysis does, and presents an indicative scholar from each section. The first issue to consider is the broad level -the alien enters the orbit and sees our planet from afar. At this point, she might ask: What is international law for? What does international law do for this planet? This level of analysis, asking what international law is for from the perspective of all, is rarefied and conceptually difficult. This level is asking the scholar to humanly conceive what an international order could do. Any answer to the proposition of what international law can do for the whole (that is, deliver stability, peace, justice, a world society) has always been subject to ready critique. 31 Yet there is a pressing reality to the idea, geographically, spatially, that we can imagine 'the whole'. 32 If we can imagine it -if we know the world exists -necessarily, asking what international law is for has a compelling practical logic to it. Indeed, the useful function of asking this very question is exhibited by Dworkin's last work. 33 The logic of asking the 'big question' is impeccable, yet the answer is almost always flawed. Scholars who look at the whole have to accept the paradox of their position: that they have the benefit of a real and pressing question that has, with almost certainty, a deeply contested answer.
The Alien Detects Patterns of Inequality
The alien continues the descent, begins to see patterns of difference and naturally asks questions relating to these emerging differences. 34 Perhaps she sees deforestation in certain areas, some people having more housing than others, pollution in one area and not in another, differences in terms of gender from one area to another, differences in work patterns, different levels of development and population density across different continents. 35 The alien can still see connections and comparisons between societies because she has not landed within one particular state. She can ask questions such as: Why is this here?, and: Why is this pattern here and not elsewhere? This is the level of analysis in which the 'why' question is prominent. Yet the question of which 'why' is chosen is in the eye of the observer. 36 Many relational questions could be asked at this level in the United States since the close of World War II. Whereas international relations realists viewed international law as merely a product of state power relations, and positivists dismissed international law entirely because it lacked both sovereign commands and a rule of recognition, scholars of the New Haven School studied law as a social process of authoritative decision making'. of analysis -for example, questions about wealth distribution, gender, environment or poverty. 37 In fact, the questions are flowing thick and fast for the alien, and so she could ask of international law: Did it cause this? Did it create this? This level involves a critique of international law's role in naturalisation or creation of patterns, as Charlesworth puts it, in the context of gender, although the comment could also be applicable to a range of categories: 'Other forms of systematic violence, or structural discrimination against women, do not constitute a crisis for international lawyers. This is rather seen as part of the status quo and not truly the business of international law'. 38 Can international law contribute to changing the patterns that the alien sees? Is modifying these patterns even a reasonable aim of international law? The overarching sense of the 'why' question is dominant at this level. International law, in some ways, will be implicated in asking and answering 'why' we have patterns that are different and unequal.
The scholar at this level has much work to do. Answering the 'why' question involves contextual sociolegal scholarship, and it is difficult work because of the fluidity and patterns of overlapping relations in social life. As Cotterrell explains, 'it should be unsurprising that new regulatory forms have been shaped to frame these kinds of relations. Sociolegal scholarship is already extensively mapping and analysing these new forms of regulation in environmental, commercial, human rights, information technology, and many other fields'. In the face of regulatory flux and underlying social dynamics, '[s]ociolegal studies can help to redraw the legal map, emphasising how and why the changing character of the social in transnational and intranational contexts forces change in structures of regulation'. 39 However, the patterns have a degree of subjectivity. Why choose patterns of deforestation? Why not choose patterns of gender? 40 So, in the first instance, scholars must think of why they have chosen those particular relational ideas. Then, the 'why' question is never going to deliver a certain answer (or a set range of answers). Not surprisingly, then, the scholar will be left with further 'whys'. At this level, scholars have the advantage of knowing that they are looking at what can be broadly called 'inequality'. Imperialism is, however [as Chimni explains], not simply the function of a certain conception of the political but equally of a certain kind of economics. Entrenched modernity has always been allied with capitalism driven by the logic of accumulation. Capital cannot rest until it has annihilated space. 41 The scholar can be buoyed by the idea that patterns do exist, so there is a degree of reality. But what is reality? Noting the omission of a 'Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)' paradigm from a symposium on method in international law published in the American Journal of International Law in 1999, Anghie and Chimni point out:
For TWAIL scholars, international law makes sense only in the context of the lived history of the peoples of the Third World. Two important characteristics of TWAIL thinking emerge from this. First, the experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism has made Third World peoples acutely sensitive to power relations among states.
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In the second instance, the task here for the international legal scholar is to be aware of the impact of power relations and to evaluate international law accordingly. 43 Such awareness, as Anghie notes, 'is surely a crucial task for any discipline that claims, however problematically and tenuously, to be concerned about the promotion of justice'. 44 International legal scholars at this level may be energised by the idea that patterns are not inevitable, and therefore feel a degree of activism and constructivism in their project. Indeed, ' [o]ne way forward is to refocus international law on issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life'. 45 But international legal scholars will naturally become mindful of a negative aspect to their evaluation of international law at this level: they cannot solve the 'why' of inequality. The patterns of inequality are living things; they are emerging; they are not always clear; they are reconnecting to other forces -historical, economic, political and legal.
The 'why' is a constant, and inequality is an important question, but there is movement here. Academics at this level have the advantage of knowing they are in for a struggle in maintaining the interdisciplinary requirements for successful tackling of the 'why' question -for selecting the pattern that is significant and then for holding on to moving patterns of multiple causations while trying to link all of this meaningfully to international law. It is a difficult task that requires judgment, skill and real-world engagement.
Landing the National
Next, the alien lands. At this point, she arrives in Adelaide. This is where Judith Gardam lived and taught, and the alien has arrived here again. And the alien asks: What does international law do in Adelaide, in Australia? Here, the scholar of international law is on firmer footing. Metaphorically, the alien has landed, but so, too, has the international scholar. There are clear lines of what international law is at a domestic level, although to say there are clear lines does not mean that there is perfect clarity. There is also ambiguity about how we implement treaties, about what international law Australia abides by. 46 Compared with the other levels of analysis, though, the capacity to describe international law at a national level and argue for how it should be formed or interpreted, or incorporated, is a more stable proposition.
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The scholar at this level has that advantage of stability, of the capacity to describe, the capacity to recommend. Here, the scholar of international law has a clearly contoured reality. The limitation of this level is that we know there is so much more to international law than Adelaide, or indeed Australia. This knowledge means that there is always a sense that scholars could be doing more. Yes, they are accurately describing and arguing within their own community, and in that sense, they are concrete and grounded. Yet there is a realisation that they are implicated, in some way, in how patterning and inequality have been, and are, formed internationally. But for their scholarship's relevance and coherence, it is necessary to assume that international law was a discrete and uncomplicated mater. 48 For the domestic international legal scholar, then, the advantage is a reality and certainty. This is a great advantage of this level of analysis, but the disadvantage is a sense of always not quite seeing the whole picture, always having the echo that this is not everything. Put differently, a sense of being too grounded has its limitations. law actually operates, how it affects decisions, interacts with municipal law, and shapes norms. 49 Finally, the alien comes to the law school, a law school in which the alien's existence was created back in 1997 by Gardam. And the alien comes this time to speak to me, and the alien will only meet one human. 50 She offers me nothing in terms of the resolution of the level of analysis. Each had its own contributions; each could describe and contain a narrative of earth. Unlike her conversation with Gardam, which revealed objective observations regarding international humanitarian law, the project has been too big and she can only say that each level held relevance and interest for the international scholar.
rEVErsaLs
There is nothing that points to one level of analysis being superior to another. Each has its potential to represent the experience of international law. However, the travels are important to replicate. In giving the overview and having a deeply agnostic view of any particular level, then, my chapter has by this point invoked visual imagery in considering the act of writing. In making our choice of area and level, we are like the alien we chose to enter and land in a space. This imagery of entering a space is important because it sets us up for what Certeau states is the most important question:
A final point remains to be determined, the most important one: how does time articulate itself on an organized space? How does it affect its 'breakthrough' in the occasional mode? In short, what constitutes the implantation of memory in a place that already forms an ensemble? 51 Certeau's formulation of this question is also the question of this chapter -that is, given that we exist as scholars and can choose anything, how do we make a breakthrough, contribute to a pre-existing space?
He goes on to say that the way of breaking through is through a response that is 52 'singular. Within the ensemble in which it occurs, it is merely one more detailan action, a word -so well-placed as to reverse the situation'. Academics writing within their chosen ensemble/space/level have the potential to provide a singular response, and write a 'word so well-placed as to reverse the situation'. This is often described as originality, a contribution, something useful; but at its best, it is a reversal of time and memory. Certeau's concept of 'reversal' only makes sense when we see writing as occurring in a space that we enter, which has its own pre-existing universe and gravity and time. That is the innately visual contribution that Gardam's alien device and travels gives: to see our embodied selves as international law writers within space, and to give a physicality to the struggle, power and purpose of international scholarship, which can enter an area and reverse an omission, literally pulling and reversing the laws and imagery that govern that space through a word.
A reversal cannot always be assumed to be for the good. Like any intervention, it may not be. But in studying the omissions, carefully checking for events, individuals and thoughts that are not there in the space, there is a natural tendency towards restraint, towards the mitigating impulses of caring for details and, perhaps, towards intuition. Orford's writing in the context of international trade is an example of such a reversal. She reflects on the classroom experience of teaching international trade, in which, through teaching and scholarship, the endless forward and closed category of international trade seems impenetrable:
Later in the subject, we moved to look closely at the work of international economic institutions and trade agreements, using human rights texts and norms to critique the forms of law that trade agreements require states to enact. In particular, we talked about whether these trade agreements constrained democratic participation and those civil and political rights designed to enable that participation. At this point, the mood shifted quite dramatically. The critique became sharper, yet a sense of hopelessness also began to grow. As one student said dully: 'But there is no other way, there is no alternative.' I felt that the discussion was deadened the more I talked about the nature of the legal forms mandated by the various agreements and their relation to human rights norms. Instead of engagement and of opening texts out to alternative readings, this discussion seemed to produce an exhausted acceptance of the inevitability or necessity of sacrifice and punishment in order to reach the goals of development or economic integration. Why did the appeal to democracy and human rights when read with capitalism produce this sense of closure? We all know (don't we?) that we don't have to organize ourselves according to this economic vision, that there are all sorts of other worlds out there that look nothing like this fantasy of perfect control and endless profit, docile bodies and redeemed souls. So what was my role in (re)producing this fantasy in my classroom? How might I approach this differently? Orford then considers the hidden sacrifice that trade involves, noting that in a World Trade Organisation (WTO) decision, the impact of levels of hormone in beef was 'nonchalantly' 55 noted in a footnote as having possibly contributed to the death of 371 women 56 from breast cancer. The WTO decision itself was concerned with risks to human health which could be legally protected, and with the nature and meaning of risk to human health. 57 In her work, Orford wrestles the women from the footnote; they had been placed there as a reasonable loss. She reclaims their ordered and embedded sacrifice, which had been contained in a logical and highly produced legal judgment. Orford then gives life to their judicially ordained, otherwise silent sacrifice. In doing so, Orford creates a space, and the women are moved from being a footnote in a WTO decision; their reversal is from irrelevance, from a utilitarian trade-off, from obscurity. The outcome of her work is to consider the sacrifice that is often closed and hidden in trade, 58 thereby reversing the silence of the ' … something [which] escapes the closed circle of this sacrifice economy'.
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Writing in a way that 'reverses' a space can be translated to any area of international law. For international trade, this could well be done by examining one development zone created under a trade agreement and looking at one life affected by that agreement. How has that trade architecture affected the people within that development zone, their lives, their opportunities? 60 For international humanitarian law, the reversal could be effected by taking one proportionality decision, following it to its real-life location, writing of and about one lawful civilian death, for one alchemic moment, turning the scales of proportionality from a leaden scale necessary for our law to a scale where the loss of one is written. Such a technique reverses for that moment the understanding of war itself. 61 55 Ibid 176.
